PARTY’S MILESTONES

After July 1954, the country’s situation had many rapid and complicated changes. An appropriate revolutionary strategy was required for the Party to move the Vietnamese revolution forward in accordance with the new situation and movement trend of the times. The big change from the policy of political struggle for the implementation of the Geneva Agreement to an armed struggle can be considered as starting from when the Revolutionary Line in the South was drafted by the Secretary of the Party Committee in the South and discussed at a conference of the Party Committee in the South in December 1956.

The revolutionary line in the South clearly stated:

This is an important document, directly contributing to the formation of the Party’s revolutionary line in the South at the 15th Plenum of the Party Central Committee. The Resolution of the 15th Plenum of the Party Central Committee (January 1959) affirmed “... the path of armed struggle to complete the basic task of the revolution in the South is to liberate the South from the yoke of imperialism and feudalism, and to complete the national democratic revolution in the South; the basic development path of the Vietnamese revolution in the South is the uprising to seize power into the hands of the people…”

The Party adhered to the current situation to formulate its prompt, sound, and strategic direction. When the enemy was determined to massacre our revolutionaries, we couldn’t maintain the delusion of only using peaceful means of resistance without any armed struggle. The bloody reality in the South during the 1954-1960 period proved this fact.

The Resolution adopted at the 15th plenum of the Party Central Committee not only strived to meet historical needs and paved the way for the revolution in the South aimed at overcoming the darkness and advancing forward, but also clearly demonstrated the independent and self-reliant revolutionary nature of the Party.  It illustrated the maturity of the Party in both theory and practice and in terms of its revolutionary guidelines and methods. It also proved the Party's leadership capability, flexible and suitable to the international situation whilst observing the legitimacy of the Geneva Agreement, staying independent, self-reliant and creative, thus fulfilling the aspirations of cadres, party members and people from all walks of life who joined together in the fight against the US and the US-backed Saigon puppet regime. This resolution created a leap forward for the revolutionary movement in the South, evident in the Dong Khoi Movement which spread across the South in the beginning of 1960.

The situation in the North and the South developed in two different directions, requiring different revolutionary methodologies. At the 13th plenum of Party Central Committee in December 1957, President Ho Chi Minh mentioned the simultaneous implementation of two strategic revolutionary tasks: the people's democratic national revolution and the socialist revolution. Both of them were crucial, and it would be wrong to defy either of them.

The direction was officially affirmed at the third National Party Congress in September 1960. In his opening speech, President Ho Chi Minh clarified “This congress aims to build socialism in the North and fight for peace and national reunification.” (Ho Chi Minh (2011) – The Complete Collection – National Political Publishing House, Hanoi, Vol. 12, page No.673).

The congress underscored the Party’s tasks and guidelines in the new stage:

Although the North and the South carried out two different revolutionary tasks, they both worked towards the common goal of liberating the South and reuniting the country.

At a time when the international situation witnessed many complicated developments, it was not easy to make a sound and precise direction for Vietnam’s revolution. During the period between late 1950s and early 1960s, Vietnam was not the only divided nation. There were also East and West Germany, South and North Korea. At that time, people used to talk about maintaining the temporary peace between the two regions rather than armed struggle and national unification.

The unprecedented guideline on simultaneously implementing two revolutionary strategies in the two regions illustrated the entire Vietnamese people’s strong determination to fight for national independence and reunification despite other forces’ intentions to divide the nation. Our people resolutely carried out our revolutionary cause. When the reality did not allow the two regions to conduct the same revolutionary task, the Party made sound evaluations of the situation and set out specific tasks in line with the circumstances in each region, thanks to a full sense of awareness and thorough analysis of all contradictions as well as the accurate identification of revolutionary forces, enemies, and styles of fighting.

Vietnam is a single nation-state; the Vietnamese people are one - this truth shall never change.” This was also the key point defining the legitimacy of the Vietnamese people's resistance war.

This was the fundamental point of view, the starting point for the Party to make specific decisions, in accordance with the changing situation in each period. The two revolutionary strategies were not separate but closely related and supported each other.

The consistent and continuous formulation and implementation of conducting two revolutionary strategies at the same time first removed ideological concerns and questions about the path forward of the Vietnamese revolution. The arguments about the continuity of the revolution and the use of revolutionary violence to fight counter-revolutionary violence towards Marxism-Leninism have been realised by the Party in the practice of the Vietnamese revolution, with a creative and appropriate application.

The simultaneous implementation of two revolutionary strategies created conditions for the two regions' revolutions to have mutually supportive conditions, paving the way for the North's support and aid to the armed struggle in the South. The first breakthroughs to aid the South, being short of people and guns, were promoted right after the Resolution of the 15th Plenum of the Party Central Committee and issued with two special missions No.559 on land and No.759 at sea. Later, the two routes opened by these two special missions developed into two legendary routes - considered symbols of the will and wisdom of Vietnam: the Ho Chi Minh Trail on land and the Ho Chi Minh Trail at sea, making a great contribution to the overall victory in the struggle for national reunification.

The North advanced towards socialism and was a great rear, a solid foundation in the fight for South liberation even during the years when the North was being fiercely attacked. The fight of the people of the South both directly defeated the strategies and tactics of the US and its henchmen on the battlefield, forcing the US to withdraw its troops from Vietnam and Indochina, while also protecting the North.

The correct line of the Party led the whole army and people to defeat this strong enemy in terms of material force; with a decisive fighting spirit and creative intelligence to overcome the opponent's modern technical equipment. It is "the art of knowing how to win step by step”, to advance to complete victory; fighting the enemy on all fronts: military, political, diplomatic, economic, cultural, with many strategies: military, political, agitation and propaganda amongst the enemy.

During the General Offensive and Uprising in the spring of 1975, the Party Central Committee chose the direction of a surprise attack, quickly grasping battlefield developments, and when the opportunity appeared, promptly determining to take advantage and promote development opportunities, with the spirit of "One day equals twenty years", quickly securing a complete victory in the resistance war against US imperialism with the historic Ho Chi Minh Campaign.

After April 1975, the whole nation entered a new historical period with excitement and confidence. Stepping out from the aura of victory of the war with the spirit of "one day is equal to twenty years", it seemed like it only took a short time to successfully build "socialist production". The fourth National Party Congress (December 1976) expected that "possibility".

The impatience to have a socialist homogeneous economy immediately led to a subjective will: developing relations of production before the productive forces were sufficiently developed. The consequence of this thinking was to accelerate the implementation of the reform of commerce, capitalism and the collectivization of agriculture in the South in a massive, hasty manner right after liberation day. The results obtained were the opposite of what was expected. The inappropriate economic model and structure, based on a poor and backward social production model severely damaged by the war, led Vietnam into a profound socio-economic crisis.

However, the deeper cause stems from perception. The severe socio-economic crisis from the late 70s to the late 80s of the 20th century in Vietnam originated from a hindrance in the perception of the basic principles of the old economic model regarding the public ownership of means of production (especially land), collective labour, the state monopoly on trade and prices, the centrally planned economy and the concept that capitalism is exploitation and the opposite of socialism. The old thinking and habit of depending on subsidies for a long time exacerbated the crisis.

The crisis urged the Communist Party of Vietnam to face an important and difficult historical task, to correct fundamental errors in its policy, first of all in the economic field and also in its overall policy in order to stand firm and grow.

Doi Moi (Renewal) in Vietnam took place as a matter of course in the context that many reforms had been conducted in the Soviet Union, Eastern European countries and China and those reforms were still underway. The instability of the built model of socialism was evident in all countries with a socialist system at that time and signs of stagnation and crisis signalled the imminent danger of collapse. Like other countries, Doi moi in Vietnam came from the demands of internal causes.

The Communist Party of Vietnam consulted the lessons learned by the political parties in the aforementioned countries, but it did not apply them mechanically, nor was pushed from the outside.  There were difficulties and deadlocks that forced the Party to think back to find a way out and to save itself.

At the macro level, after many attempts to improve the old model with many movements and campaigns and the raising of many “flags” both in the economy and in the ideological field without any results, the situation was getting worse and worse. Realistic (and well-experienced) minds realised that this willpower could not continue alone. At lower levels, cadres and people in some localities had sought to “tear down the fence” and bypass the gaps of the current institution to conduct more effective economic activities.

After a period (from 1979 to 1986), practice at the grassroots level proved that it was necessary and possible to comprehensively renew, thereby creating a decisive shift in leadership thinking from those holding the highest positions in the Party, marked by the 6th National Party Congress in December 1986.

It was the vivid innovation practices at the grassroots and localities that provided the material for the formation of the comprehensive Doi Moi policy of the Communist Party of Vietnam. From overcoming difficulties in practice, great steps were taken to modify economic thinking. Many conservative views, prejudices and misconceptions about the commodity economy, bourgeoisie, and exploitation became a more realistic and confident view of the market economy, multilateral cooperation and integration, and the “symbiosis” between economic sectors in the new economic environment.

The Doi Moi process has undergone many systematic breakthroughs:

By the end of the sixth term of the Party Congress (1991), the Doi Moi reform had cleared the process of opening up the development of multi-sectoral commodity economy, the reform of State management of the economy, self-reliance in expanding multilateral economic relations and the gradual integration into the world and regional economy.

The Doi Moi process was initiated and led by the Communist Party of Vietnam since 1986 as a continuous creative process that “removes old things while building the new from the root to the top. It is essential to form both new productive forces and relations of production; and create both new material life and new spiritual and cultural life.” (The Vietnamese Communist Party: The Complete Collection of Party Documents, National Political Publishing House, Hanoi, 2004, Vol.37, Page 508).