With the superiority of air force firepower and artillery support, the enemy concentrated their forces and counterattack fire to recapture the top of Hill C1, forcing a company of the 439th Battalion, 98th Regiment, to retreat down to the eastern half of the hill.
At 9:00pm the same day, the 98th Regiment organised a counterattack, however it was unsuccessful. During the day, the French army dropped 302 legionnaire paratroopers, along with 195 tonnes of ammunition to Dien Bien Phu.
At our request, both sides exchanged wounded soldiers. Wounded French troops were returned on the south of Claudine on Road 41, while our wounded soldiers were returned at Km 2 of Pavie Road (to Lai Chau).
To carry out the remaining tasks of the second phase, according to the determination of the Campaign Command, on April 10, 1954, the General Command issued Order No. 95/B1, as signed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Vietnamese People’s Army General Vo Nguyen Giap, and assigned specific tasks to the 308th, 312th, 316th, 304th and 351th Divisions.
On the same day, the General Department of Politics issued Directive No. 88-CTH, signed by its Chairman Nguyen Chi Thanh, on ideological leadership to complete the Winter-Spring Campaign. The directive was dispatched to divisions, command regions and regiments. Specifically, the directive praised officers and soldiers for their high spirit to endure hardships, overcome difficulties, fight heroically and record many great achievements, especially during the battles at Gia Lam Airport, Cat Bi Airport, Road No. 5 and in the Central Highlands.
Thanh put forward a principle of ideological leadership: stepping up propaganda, boosting soldiers’ fighting morale, further enhancing the determination to kill the enemy; overcoming the thought of underestimating the enemy, fear of fatigue, and wanting to rest; and actively coordinating with Dien Bien Phu to kill more enemy troops, clinching the total victory for the Winter-Spring Campaign.
