The decisive catalyst behind the victory that liberated the Vietnamese nation from colonial and feudal domination was the leadership of the Communist Party of Viet Nam, with Party organisations and Party members forming its core. Although still a young Party with only around 5,000 members, its tightly organised system, particularly the initiative and creativity demonstrated by Party committees and grassroots cells, empowered the Party to translate the Central Committee’s leadership guidelines into revolutionary action by millions of people.
Party organisations functioned as the political nucleus and the driving force of the great national unity bloc. Their ability to act independently, remain closely attuned to realities on the ground, and seize the right moment positioned the revolutionary forces to assume power swiftly and with minimal losses.
The historic lesson about organisational strength and the initiative and creativity of Party committees, forged in the autumn of 1945, has since become a consistent thread running through the Vietnamese revolution, enabling the country to accomplish pivotal tasks at subsequent stages of its development.
As Viet Nam entered the Doi Moi (Renewal) period, the need for self-rectification, renewed thinking, and stronger grassroots Party organisations continued to be a decisive factor propelling the Party to guide the country out of socio-economic crisis, develop the theoretical foundations of the Doi Moi policy, and further clarify Viet Nam’s path towards socialism.
At present, as the goal of double-digit growth poses formidable challenges, the Party must prioritise expanding and strengthening the leadership role of grassroots Party organisations to guarantee that development remains firmly oriented towards socialism.
During the August Revolution of 1945, Party organisations demonstrated their paramount leadership role in several key respects.
First, there was a close connection between the astute leadership of the Party Central Committee and the initiative and creativity of Party committees and organisations at the local level.
When the revolutionary opportunity emerged, communications between the Party Central Committee and localities were severed by enemy forces and geographical constraints. Had local Party organisations waited for direct orders or written instructions from higher levels, the historic opportunity might have slipped away. At this decisive juncture, it was precisely the initiative and capacity for independent thinking of local Party organisations that proved instrumental to the revolution’s success.
Entering the Doi Moi period, the need for self-rectification, renewed thinking, and enhanced combativeness of grassroots Party organisations continued to be a decisive factor empowering the Party to guide the country out of socio-economic crisis, develop the theoretical foundations of the Doi Moi policy, and further clarify Viet Nam’s path towards socialism.
On the one hand, Party committees and organisations consistently and rigorously internalised and executed the strategic guidelines and policies of the Party Central Committee, particularly the principle of placing national liberation above all other tasks. On the other hand, local Party organisations demonstrated exceptional initiative and creativity. Party committees proactively assessed the situation and translated the Central Committee’s guidelines into mobilisation strategies suited to the particular conditions of each locality. They also took the initiative in organising uprisings to seize power rather than passively waiting for instructions from higher levels.
Second, Party organisations took the initiative in formulating effective strategies to mobilise the people. Imbued with the Viet Minh Front’s principle of great national unity, Party organisations in each locality creatively developed mass mobilisation tactics suited to the characteristics of different regions. In rural areas, Party committees focused on building national salvation self-defence units in conjunction with the movement to break into Japanese granaries to alleviate the famine. This generated powerful momentum and attracted millions of peasants. In urban centres such as Ha Noi, Sai Gon, and Hue, Party organisations adopted flexible approaches to reach out to, win over, and differentiate among youth, intellectual, and civil-servant organisations associated with the former regime. They also built self-defence forces and made preparations for armed mass demonstrations.
Third, Party organisations exhibited ingenuity in seizing opportunities and determining the timing of uprisings. The ability of local Party organisations to assess realities on the ground peaked when they independently determined when to launch uprisings. Recognising that the puppet administration had descended into extreme confusion following Japan’s surrender, local Party committees did not wait for specific instructions from the Central Committee, but proactively decided to act based on the prevailing conditions in their localities.
In Quang Nam, Hai Duong, Ha Tinh, and Quang Ngai, provincial Party committees led the people to seize power on August 18, 1945, making them among the earliest localities in the country to do so.
In Ha Noi, the municipal Party Committee and the Insurrection Committee seized the opportunity presented by a rally organised by the puppet administration on August 17, 1945, transforming it into a revolutionary demonstration. They then decided to launch the uprising on August 19, 1945, before receiving the official order for the General Uprising from Tan Trao.
In Southern Viet Nam, after carefully assessing the situation in Sai Gon and neighbouring provinces, the Southern Regional Party Committee decided to select Tan An as a pilot site before launching the uprising across the region, culminating in victory on August 25, 1945.
It was precisely this flexibility and creativity in applying the Party’s general guidelines to the specific circumstances of each locality that generated a powerful combined momentum, precipitating the enemy’s ruling apparatus to collapse across a vast area in less than half a month.
Building on and further promoting the historic lessons of the August Revolution of 1945, the 14th National Party Congress represented a major breakthrough in guiding Viet Nam’s current process of national renewal and development, emphasising the vigorous advancement of comprehensive decentralisation and delegation of authority in tandem with enhancing implementation capacity, autonomy, and accountability among Party committees and organisations at all levels. If grassroots Party organisations lack the capacity to act autonomously, remain accustomed to passivity, or become reluctant to act for fear of making mistakes, development opportunities for both localities and the country as a whole may be lost.
Moving forward, priority must be given to the following key areas:
First, it is crucial to enhance the leadership capacity and combativeness of every Party cell. In the current process of renewal, industrialisation, modernisation, and international integration, Party cells are directly responsible for translating the Party’s guidelines and policies into practice. Building clean and strong Party cells will serve to prevent and reverse degradation in political ideology, morality, and lifestyle, as well as manifestations of “self-evolution” and “self-transformation” within the Party. This will ensure that every Party cell and grassroots Party organisation functions as the political nucleus of its locality, agency, or enterprise.
Second, priority should be placed on building Party organisations that maintain close ties with the people, trust the people, and rely on the people. Drawing on the lesson that “the people are the root” from the August Revolution of 1945, Party organisations today must remain firmly rooted at the grassroots level and comprehensively understand the people’s legitimate aspirations and concerns. All activities of Party members and Party organisations must place the interests of the people above all else, rely on the people in Party building and in the fight against corruption, negative practices, and wastefulness, thereby consolidating public trust in the Party.
Third, Party organisations should modernise leadership methods and remain proactive and flexible in responding to developments in practice. At the current stage, they need to renew their thinking and working methods, advance administrative reform within the Party, accelerate digital transformation, and enhance initiative and creativity. They must remain responsive to rapid and complex changes in the socio-economic and international landscape to devise effective solutions and successfully fulfil their assigned political tasks.
The leadership capacity and combativeness of Party organisations today are gauged by their ability to translate the Central Committee’s guidelines into practical action programmes tailored to the specific circumstances of each agency, unit, and locality. Upholding the spirit of “initiative and creativity” demonstrated during the August Revolution of 1945, Party organisations today are required to vigorously renew their methods of operation and decisively overcome formalistic or overly administrative Party-cell meetings, as well as the passive tendency to wait for guidance from higher-level Party committees. Every Party organisation must possess sufficient capacity to anticipate and promptly identify shifts in political thinking and bottlenecks at the grassroots level, enabling it to take timely and appropriate decisions.
At a time when the entire Party and people are implementing the Resolution of the 14th National Party Congress and advancing the country into a new era, the historic lessons of the August Revolution of 1945 assume even greater significance. To realise the aspiration of building a prosperous, civilised, and happy nation, the decisive factor is to continuously enhance the leadership capacity, combativeness, and initiative of Party organisations and Party members, beginning at the grassroots level.
